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This paper evaluates the political economy and structural factors
explaining the collection eﬃciency of the Value Added Tax (VAT),
where the collection eﬃciency is determined by the probability of audit
and by the penalty on underpaying, and implementation lags imply that
the present policy maker determines the eﬃciency of the tax system next
period. Theory suggests that the collection eﬃciency is aﬀected by
political economy considerations – greater polarization and political
instability would reduce the eﬃciency of the tax collection, and
collection is impacted by structural factors aﬀecting the ease of tax
evasion (such as urbanization, agriculture share, openness). We evaluate
the VAT collection eﬃciency (VAT revenue over the aggregate
consumption divided by the standard VAT rate) in a panel of 44
countries over 1970–99. A one standard deviation increase in durability
of political regime, and in the ease and ﬂuidity of political participation,
increases the VAT collection eﬃciency by 3.1% and 3.6%, respectively.
A one standard deviation increase in urbanization, trade openness and
the share of agriculture, changes the VAT collection eﬃciency by 12.7%,
3.9% and –4.8%, respectively. Qualitatively identical results apply for
the ratio of VAT revenue to GDP divided by the standard VAT.
Keywords: VAT; tax collection costs; trade openness; political
instability; urbanization
JEL Classiﬁcation: F15, H21
Introduction
Growing numbers of policy analysts and politicians are saying that it may
ﬁnally be time to consider a value-added tax as part of our federal revenue
system. In years past, I would have been in the forefront of those denouncing
the idea . . . the main reason for this is that it was too easy to raise V.A.T. rates
amid the double-digit price increases of the inﬂationary 1970’s. In those days,
there were many economists who still believed that budget deﬁcits caused
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inﬂation, making it easier to delude people into thinking that higher taxes were
necessary to get inﬂation under control . . . Those countries that adopted the
value-added tax since the end of the great inﬂation, however, have been very
restrained in raising rates . . . But unless spending is checked or revenue raised,
we are facing deﬁcits of historic proportions . . . When that day comes, huge
tax increases are inevitable because no one has the guts to seriously cut health
spending. Therefore, the only question is how will the revenue be raised: in a
smart way that preserves incentives and reduces growth as little as possible, or
stupidly by raising marginal tax rates and making everything bad in our tax
code worse? If the ﬁrst route is chosen, the value-added tax is by far the best
option available to deal with an unpalatable situation. (From ‘Feed the Beast,
Republicans are the Problem’, New York Times, 6 April 2005, Bruce Bartlett)
The globalization of trade and ﬁnance has profound implications on the
patterns of taxes. Developing countries used to rely heavily on trade taxes,
seigniorage and ﬁnancial repression as the main sources of ﬁscal revenue. A
common denominator of these taxes is that they are associated with a
relatively low cost of collection and enforcement – trade taxes are collected
at a centralized port of entry, and seigniorage and ﬁnancial repression act as
an implicit tax. Greater trade integration has implied a drastic cut in tariﬀs,
thereby reducing the revenue of trade taxes. Successful macro stabilizations
and greater ﬁnancial openness sharply reduced the revenue from seigniorage
and ﬁnancial repression.1 While most of these developments enhanced
eﬃciency, they also exposed developing countries to the challenge of ﬁnding
alternative means of ﬁnancing ﬁscal needs.
Most countries dealt with the new challenges by adopting new taxes,
including the Value Added Tax (VAT). Today, VAT is a major part of the
tax system in over 136 countries, raising about one-quarter of the world’s
tax revenue (Ebrill et al. 2001; 2002). The debate regarding the welfare gains
associated with switching from trade taxes to VAT is not over. Emran and
Stiglitz (2005) cautioned that the welfare gains from a switch to the VAT are
questionable in the presence of a large informal sector. Baunsgaard and
Keen (2005) found that for middle-income countries, revenue recovery
following trade liberalization has been about 50 cents for each dollar of lost
trade tax revenue, and the revenue recovery has been very weak in low-
income countries. Nor is there much evidence that the mere presence of a
value-added tax has made it easier to cope with the revenue eﬀects of trade
liberalization. As the lead citation points out, adopting the VAT also
remains a debated issue in the USA, framed occasionally as ‘A too easy tax
to collect’ by advocates of the ‘Starve the beast’ approach to government’s
size, versus views that focus on the welfare cost of alternative taxes.
A frequently cited advantage of the VAT is that this tax is collected
throughout the production chain, giving it a practical advantage.2
Speciﬁcally, the VAT should be associated with easier enforcement, as it
allows the ﬁscal authority to compare reported sales of each intermediate
product with reported purchases of producers using that intermediate
392 J. Aizenman and Y. Jinjarak
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
B
y:
 [C
D
L 
Jo
ur
na
ls
 A
cc
ou
nt
] A
t: 
00
:2
3 
11
 J
ul
y 
20
08
 
product as an input in a vertical production chain. While the VAT may
indeed be an easier tax to enforce than income tax, the VAT is not a panacea
– enforcing it involves spending resources on collecting and processing
information, prosecuting and penalizing agents found underpaying the tax,
etc. Hence, one expects that VAT collection eﬃciency increases with the
resources spent on enforcement, and with the eﬃciency of monitoring,
collecting and processing information. Theory suggests that the enforce-
ability of taxes is impacted by political economy considerations – greater
polarization and political instability would tend to reduce the eﬃciency of
tax collection, reducing the resources devoted to tax enforcement. In
addition, collection is impacted by structural factors that aﬀect the ease of
tax evasion, like the urbanization level, the share of agriculture and trade
openness.
The purpose of this paper is to verify the dependence of VAT collection
eﬃciency on key structural and political economy factors. The ﬁrst section
outlines a model determining VAT eﬃciency, extending Cukierman et al.
(1992). Speciﬁcally, we model the optimal tax evasion of agents, in an
economy where the government determines optimally the probability of
audit and the penalty associated with underpaying the VAT. We show that
greater political instability and polarization tends to reduce tax eﬃciency.
Similarly, economic structures that increase the cost of enforcement, like less
urbanization, less trade openness and higher share of agriculture, reduce the
collection eﬃciency of the VAT.
The following section conﬁrms these predictions in a study that explains
two measures of VAT collection eﬃciency. The ﬁrst, dubbed C-eﬃciency, is
the ratio of the VAT revenue to aggregate consumption, divided by the
standard VAT rate. The second is the ratio of VAT revenue to GDP, divided
by the standard VAT rate.3 The closer these ratios are to zero (one), the lower
(higher) the collection eﬃciency of the VAT tax. Having information on the
standard VAT rate in 2003 for a sample of 44 countries, we assume that the
statutory rates do not change frequently in practice, and use information
about the annual VAT revenues, economic and political variables of the 44
countries over the period 1970–99. During this sample period, the collection
eﬃciency of VAT ranges from 2.4% in Belarus, 9.6% in Mexico, to 45.2% in
Finland. The data also suggest a wide range of VAT experiences. There is no
systematic diﬀerence in statutory VAT rates between high-income and
developing countries. The size of VAT revenue as a percentage of total tax
revenue varies from 6.6% in Japan, to 40.5% in Chile. VAT revenue to GDP
ranges from 0.1% in Guinea to 10% in Norway. Across countries, VAT
revenues to GDP increase with real GDP per capita, and urbanization share
of population, and decrease with agriculture share of GDP.
The main ﬁndings reported in the following section are that political
economy and structure matter in ways consistent with the theory. The eﬀects
are economically and statistically signiﬁcant. A one standard deviation
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increase in durability of political regime, and in the ease and ﬂuidity of
political participation, increase the ﬁrst VAT collection eﬃciency measure
(C-eﬃciency) by 3.1% and 3.6%, respectively. A one standard deviation
increase in urbanization, trade openness and the share of agriculture
changes the VAT collection eﬃciency by 12.7%, 3.9% and –4.8%,
respectively. In addition, a one standard deviation increase in the GDP/
Capita increases the tax eﬃciency by 8.1%. Qualitatively identical results
apply for the alternative measure of VAT collection eﬃciency. Section 2
closes the paper with concluding remarks.
The model
Our benchmark model is adopted from Cukierman et al. (1992), which
explains the obstacles to tax reforms in polarized countries, characterized by
political instability. They focused on the case where ﬁscal revenue can be raised
by taxes associated with collection costs (such as income taxes), and implicit
taxes where the collection cost is zero, such as the inﬂation tax. They assumed
implementation lags – the present policy maker determines the eﬃciency of the
tax system next period. This implies that the choice of the tax system eﬃciency
may be strategic – the current policy maker may choose an ineﬃcient future
tax system in order to constrain the ﬁscal revenue available to future policy
makers. This prevents future policy makers from spending in ways that are
viewed as inferior from the vantage point of the present policy maker.
The economy at time t is described by two representative budget
constraints: the government, (1) and the private sector, (2):
gt þ ft þ yt  tat þ st ð1Þ
ct ¼ 1 tat  st  dð~ttÞ  gðstÞ ð2Þ
Each individual is endowed with one unit of output in each period. The
variables gt; ft represent two diﬀerent public goods (say guns and butter) in
per capita terms, and ct is per-capita private consumption. The term yt is the
ﬁscal investment in tax capacity, the impact of which is discussed below. The
government collects from each individual an amount st, in the form of
seigniorage, and an amount tat of actual VAT revenue. The statutory VAT
rate is ~tt. Seigniorage carries no administrative costs, whereas the VAT is
associated with costly enforcement, described below. Both VAT and
seigniorage impose convex deadweight losses on the private sector, equal
to dð~ttÞ; gðstÞ, satisfying d0 4 0, d00 4 0, g0 4 0, g00 4 0.
The agent’s problem
Underpaying the VAT is costly: with probability pt, the agent is audited. If
she is found paying tt below the statutory rate, she would be penalized,
394 J. Aizenman and Y. Jinjarak
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paying ~tt þ 0:5ft½~tt  tt2. Hence, underpaying is associated with a quad-
ratic penalty of 0:5ft½~tt  tt2, paid with probability pt. The period t utility
from the private consumption is U(ct). The representative agent would
submit tax payment tst , maximizing her expected utility:
max
tt
ptUðct;aÞ þ ð1 ptÞUðct;nÞ
  ð3Þ
where ct,a (ct,n) is the agent’s private consumption at time t if she is audited
(not audited):
ct;a ¼ 1 f~tt þ 0:5ft½~tt  tt2g  st  dð~ttÞ  gðstÞ
ct;n ¼ 1 tt  st  dð~ttÞ  gðstÞ
Optimizing equation (3), the optimal submitted tax, denoted by tst , is:
tst ¼ ~tt 
1 pt
ptft
ð1 lÞ ð4Þ
where l is the risk premium adjustment, l ¼ ðU0ðct;aÞ U0ðct;nÞÞ=
ðU0ðct;aÞÞ  0 and U0(ct) is the marginal utility associated with consumption
ct. The risk term, l, is the percentage gap of the marginal utilities between
the audit and no-audit cases. The resultant expected tax payment is:
E½tt ¼ ~tt  0:5
ð1 ptÞ2
ptft
ð1 l2Þ ð5Þ
The expected tax payment increases with the probability of an audit, and
with the penalty rate associated with underpayment. It also increases with
the degree of risk aversion – higher risk aversion increases the utility cost
associated with being audited. In practice, the risk adjustment term, l, is of
second order magnitude in circumstances where the tax gap between the
increases in tax payment associated with audit, is small relative to total
consumption. Thus, for simplicity, we henceforth ignore this risk adjustment
term, assuming l ﬃ 0.4
The economy is populated with a large number of atomistic agents.
Hence, from the point of view of the authorities, the idiosyncratic risk
associated with tax evasion is diversiﬁed away – in the macro budget
constraints (1) and (2), the actual tax revenue tat is the expected tax payment
of the atomistic agent,
tat ¼ ~tt  0:5
ð1 ptÞ2
ptft
ð1 l2Þ ﬃ ~tt  0:5 ð1 ptÞ
2
ptft
ð6Þ
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The policy maker problem
There are two possible policymaker types, L and R, who randomly alternate
in oﬃce. The policy maker of type i, i ¼ L, R maximizes welfare:
wti ¼ Et
X1
k¼0
bk UðctþkÞ þHiðgtþk; ftþkÞ
 ( )
; 1 > b > 0 ð7Þ
where Et denotes the expectation operator, U is a concave utility function.
The utility from consuming g and f, Hi, is deﬁned as follows,
HLðg; fÞ ¼ 1
að1 aÞ
 
min ½ag; ð1 aÞf;
1 > a > 0
HRðg; fÞ ¼ 1
að1 aÞ
 
min ½ð1 aÞg; af;
ð8Þ
Thus, the two policy makers diﬀer only in the desired composition of the
public good, where their disagreement is parameterized by a 0:5j j. By
construction, the overall weight given to private versus public consumption,
does not depend on the disagreement parameter, a.
The political system is described as a Markov process with transition
probabilities p and 1 7 p: the government in oﬃce at time t has a ﬁxed
probability 1 7 p of being reappointed next period. With probability p, it is
thrown out of oﬃce and the other policymaker type is appointed.
Let x : g þ f denote the total amount of government spending. For
concreteness, we assume a 4 0.5. While the private agent views the
probability of an audit, and the penalty rate at time t, as exogenous, these
variables are pre-determined by the policy maker at time t 7 1. The
eﬃciency of the tax system is determined by the probability of an audit, and
by the penalty associated with tax evasion, p and f, respectively. We assume
that both p and f are determined by the investment in tax capacity, y. To
capture the greater inertia in reforming the tax system than in changing
ﬁscal policy, assume that the investment in tax eﬃciency, y, along with p and
f, but not the other policy variables (~tt; st; gt; ft), must be chosen one
period in advance. Thus, yt71 was chosen at time t 7 1, but exerts an
inﬂuence on the eﬃciency of the tax system only at time t:
pt ¼ ptðyt1; STÞ; p0 > 0; p00 < 0
ft ¼ ftðyt1; STÞ; f0 > 0; f00 < 0
ð9Þ
where ST is the vector of structural factors impacting the cost of tax
collection. Speciﬁcally, the high urbanization rate, lower share of agriculture
396 J. Aizenman and Y. Jinjarak
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and higher trade openness may reduce the eﬀective cost of monitoring and
collecting information, implying greater eﬃciency of the collection system.
As these structural factors are changing slowly, we view them beyond the
control of the policy maker, and focus on the determination of optimal
investment in tax capacity, yt.
Our system diﬀers from the one in Cukierman et al. (1992) in two ways: we
model the tax aversion and the auditing process, and we assume that
improving the eﬃciency of the tax system at time t involves a costly investment
at time t 7 1. Despite these modiﬁcations, the solution methodology of
Cukierman et al. (1992) continues to apply. As in Proposition 1 in Cukierman
et al. (1992), optimal choices of consumption, aggregate public good,
seigniorage and VAT are a function of the eﬃciency of the tax system:
c ¼ CðyÞ; x ¼ XðyÞ; s ¼ SðyÞ; ðtaÞ ¼ TðyÞ ð10Þ
satisfying C0(y) 5 0; X0(y) 4 0; S0(y) 5 0; T 0(y) 4 0, where z denotes the
optimal value of z. The equilibrium value of the tax rate chosen, y, satisﬁes
the ﬁrst-order condition:5
bU0ðCðyÞÞC0ðyÞ þ 1 pþ p 1 a
a
 
X0ðyÞ ¼ 1 ð11Þ
The main results of the model are summarized in a proposition akin to
Proposition 2 in Cukierman et al. (1992):
(1) If the current government is certain of being reappointed, or if there
is no polarization (p ¼ 0 or a ¼ 0.5), then it brings about the most
eﬃcient tax system. The corresponding FOC is bU0(C(y))C0(y) þ
X0(y) ¼ 1.
(2) The lower the probability that the current government will remain in
oﬃce and the greater the polarization, the more ineﬃcient is the tax
system left as a legacy to the future administration. This ineﬃciency
is manifested by lower investment in tax capacity, inducing a lower
probability of auditing and a lower penalty on tax evasion, reducing
thereby the tax collection associated with a given statutory VAT
rate. Structural factors that increase the ease of tax evasion reduce
the equilibrium tax collection.
The evidence
As of 2004, 136 countries have implemented a VAT (International Tax
Dialogue 2005). About one-third of these countries have complete
information on annual VAT revenues, and corresponding economic,
structural and political variables in those years. Table 1 reports statutory
VAT rates, and averages of the actual VAT revenues over 1970–99, for these
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Table 1. VAT: rates and revenues.
VAT revenue
Country
Year
VAT
introduced
Statutory
VAT rates
as of 2003
Percentage
of GDP
Percentage
of total
tax revenue
Number of
observations
Albania 1996 20.0 1.3 34.6 3
Argentina 1975 21.0 1.9 21.5 11
Azerbaijan 1992 18.0 0.5 16.0 6
Belarus 1992 18.0 0.4 19.6 8
Belgium 1971 21.0 7.5 17.6 28
Bolivia 1973 14.9 1.4 33.6 15
Brazil 1967 20.5 0.9 9.2 5
Cameroon 1999 18.7 1.1 27.9 1
Canada 1991 7.0 2.3 13.3 7
Chile 1975 19.0 4.4 40.5 25
Colombia 1975 16.0 1.2 28.7 25
Costa Rica 1975 13.0 1.7 16.6 25
Cyprus 1992 15.0 2.8 16.2 3
Estonia 1992 18.0 2.9 32.1 8
Finland 1994 22.0 9.9 29.7 5
Greece 1987 18.0 6.1 35.8 12
Guinea 1996 18.0 0.1 5.5 2
Honduras 1976 12.0 0.5 7.4 6
Hungary 1988 25.0 3.4 20.1 12
Indonesia 1985 10.0 0.9 21.9 15
Italy 1973 20.0 4.6 15.2 26
Japan 1989 5.0 1.5 6.6 5
Korea, Rep. 1977 10.0 2.3 23.8 3
Mauritius 1998 15.0 0.9 19.9 2
Mexico 1980 15.0 1.4 21.5 19
Morocco 1986 20.0 1.9 24.2 10
Nepal 1997 10.0 0.4 28.0 3
Nicaragua 1975 14.0 0.6 11.8 6
Norway 1970 24.0 10.6 25.5 27
Pakistan 1990 15.0 0.5 15.7 10
Panama 1977 5.0 0.9 8.5 15
Paraguay 1993 10.0 1.0 37.7 1
Peru 1973 19.0 2.4 35.2 11
Poland 1993 22.0 3.3 22.6 6
Russian
Federation
1992 18.0 1.2 25.5 4
Senegal 1980 17.0 1.5 18.0 5
South Africa 1991 14.0 2.8 23.9 9
Thailand 1992 7.0 1.3 22.1 8
Trinidad and
Tobago
1990 15.0 2.2 20.8 3
Tunisia 1988 18.0 1.2 14.3 12
Turkey 1985 18.0 1.8 28.7 14
Uruguay 1968 23.0 3.3 26.0 24
Venezuela, RB 1993 16.0 2.0 26.4 7
Zambia 1995 17.5 2.6 32.3 2
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44 countries for which data are available. Because we only have access to the
last year of cross-country information on statutory VAT rates, our
investigation is forced to use VAT rates as of the year 2003. Nevertheless,
the VAT rates do not change frequently over time. Due to these data
limitations, we end up with a total of 454 observations.
In the sample, the earliest implementation of VAT was by Brazil in 1967,
and the latest by Cameroon in 1999.6 There is no systematic diﬀerence in
statutory VAT rates between high-income and developing countries. The
size of VAT revenue in total tax revenue varies from 6.6% in Japan to
40.5% in Chile. Figure 1 relates cross-country VAT revenue to a set of
economic variables. VAT revenue to GDP tends to increase with real GDP
per capita, urbanization share of population, and decrease with the
agriculture share of GDP. To answer how this cross-country variability
can be explained by economic variables, we estimate panel linear equations
of VAT collection eﬃciency controlling for a set of explanatory variables
suggested in the literature.
We calculate VAT collection eﬃciency using two alternatives: (i)
C-eﬃciency ratio, deﬁned as annual VAT revenue/consumption divided by
the year 2003’s standard VAT rate; (ii) Eﬃciency ratio, deﬁned as annual
VAT revenue/GDP divided by the year 2003’s standard VAT rate. The
diﬀerence between the two alternatives is that the C-eﬃciency ratio is
normalized by reference to a consumption-type VAT, whereas the Eﬃciency
ratio is normalized by reference to an income-type VAT.
The explanatory variables are:
(a) Measures of economic development: real GDP per capita. We expect
that a higher level of income should be associated with higher VAT
collection eﬃciency.
(b) Composition of gross domestic product and population: agricultural
share in GDP, trade openness and urbanization of population. We
expect that it is more diﬃcult to administer and collect VAT in less
urbanized, more rural countries. We also include trade to GDP since
imports are an important base for VAT, and represent the part of the
VAT that is more easily enforced.7
(c) Measures of political instability and ﬂuidity of political participation:
durability of political regime and regulation of political participation.
We expect higher VAT performance in countries with a more stable
political regime and highly regulated political participation (hence,
more homogeneous societies with relatively ﬂuid political participa-
tion), than less stable, more polarized political systems.
The Data Appendix provides sources and details of these variables.
Table 2 reports the results for the two alternative measures of VAT
collection eﬃciency. To handle both the time and cross-country dimension
The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development 399
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Figure 1. Cross-country VAT revenues, 1970–99.
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of the data, we employ ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation including year dummies. The
dependent variable for the ﬁrst three columns is the C-eﬃciency ratio, and
for the last three columns the Eﬃciency ratio. Using the C-eﬃciency ratio as
a measure of VAT performance (columns I–III), all of the coeﬃcient
estimates have the expected sign. Urbanization, trade openness, real GDP
per capita and measures of political stability and ﬂuidity of political
participation, enter positively, indicating that VAT collection eﬃciency is
increasing in these variables. In addition, a higher agriculture share of GDP
is associated with a signiﬁcantly lower VAT performance. Furthermore,
these explanatory variables are robust to various speciﬁcations. Columns
IV–VI, with the Eﬃciency ratio as the dependent variable, yield similar
results. One exception is the urbanization of population, which has the
expected sign, but is not statistically signiﬁcant.
These regressions account for 55–67% of the variance in the data.
Figure 2 summarizes the contribution of the explanatory variables in
regressions III and VI. The economic signiﬁcance of these variables is
sizable. The two most important variables explaining the VAT
performance are the urbanization share of population, and real GDP
per capita. A one standard deviation increase in the urbanization share
(18.1% of the total population) raises the VAT C-eﬃciency ratio by 12.7%,
and the Eﬃciency ratio by 4.4%. A one standard deviation increase in per
capita GDP (US $5,960) raises the C-eﬃciency ratio by 8.1% and the
Eﬃciency ratio by 4.6%. A one standard deviation increase in trade
openness raises the C-eﬃciency ratio by 3.9%, and the Eﬃciency ratio by
1.7%. A one standard deviation increase in the GDP share of agriculture
reduces the C-eﬃciency ratio by 4.8%, and the Eﬃciency ratio by 3.5%.
Political economy variables also provide a signiﬁcant explanation of the
VAT performance. A one standard deviation increase of the durability of
the political regime, and the regulation of political participation, raise the
VAT C-eﬃciency by 3.1% and 3.6%, respectively. Similar results apply to
the impact of political economy variables on VAT measured by the
Eﬃciency ratio.
Tables 3 and 4 provide robustness checks of our main results. In columns
VII and VIII of Table 3, we added the age of the VAT (years since ﬁrst
implemented) to the regressions to capture how the maturity of the VAT
may inﬂuence its collection eﬃciency. The age of the VAT has an
unexpected negative sign, but it is insigniﬁcant and provides essentially no
explanatory power to the regressions of VAT performance. Ebrill et al.
(2001) found weak support for the role of VAT age in collection eﬃciency.
One interpretation is that while administration of, and compliance with, the
VAT may improve with experience, the structural and political factors of the
economy are more important considerations. Indeed, we continue to ﬁnd
economically signiﬁcant eﬀects of the main explanatory variables in our
benchmark regressions of Table 2.
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In the last four columns of Table 3 we check whether the associa-
tion between VAT collection eﬃciency, and its determinants, diﬀers
between high-income and developing countries. Columns IX and X refer
Figure 2. Eﬀects of a one standard deviation change in explanatory variables.
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to high-income countries in the sample. The last two columns refer to
developing countries only. For the developing countries, all of the coeﬃcient
estimates continue to have the expected sign and economic signiﬁcance.
Contrast this with the result that only real GDP per capita, and agriculture
share of GDP have explanatory power when considering VAT collection
eﬃciency in the high-income group. It is possible to interpret this result as
supporting the hypothesis that collection costs and political instability are
likely to be more important to VAT performance in developing countries,
than in high-income countries. Alternatively, the variation in the political
economy variable, among the high income countries, is not sizable enough
to matter for explaining the tax eﬃciency. It is also possible that given the
importance of, and diﬀerence in, the level of ﬁnancial openness across
countries, the actual implementation of VAT on ﬁnancial services involves
diﬀerent problems in developing countries, than exist in high-income
countries (on taxation of ﬁnancial services under a VAT, see Auerbach and
Gordon 2002).
Table 4 reports cross-country OLS regressions, which, given data
limitations, allow us to explore the association between VAT collection
eﬃciency and income inequality. The cross-country sample is an average
over the period 1970–99, covering 40 countries. In a cross-country context,
income level, as measured by real GDP per capita, is highly correlated with
other explanatory variables (–0.69 with the agriculture share; 0.68 with the
durability of political regime; –0.50 with the GINI index). Columns XIV and
XVI provide the explanatory power of the main structural, political and
income inequality variables, on VAT performance. As in the panel
estimation, the eﬀects of the agriculture share and the durability of political
Table 4. Cross-country VAT and income inequality.
Dependent:
C-eﬃciency Eﬃciency
Explanatory variables XIII XIV XV XVI
Real GDP per capita 2.755 1.584
***(0.278) ***(0.166)
Agriculture share of GDP 70.998 70.553
***(0.226) ***(0.136)
Durability of political regime 0.311 0.183
***(0.100) ***(0.060)
GINI coeﬃcient 70.415 70.236
**(0.192) **(0.116)
Number of country 40 40 40 40
R-squared 0.722 0.614 0.705 0.585
Notes: The sample is a cross-country averages over the period 1970–99. The method of
estimation is OLS. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote signiﬁcance levels at
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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regime continue to be sizable and the cross-country regressions account for
59–61% of the variance in the data. A one standard deviation increase in
the former is associated with 5.15% (9.3%) reduction in VAT eﬃciency
(C-eﬃciency). An additional year of continuing political regime is associated
with a 0.31% increase in VAT performance. Income inequality, as measured
by the GINI coeﬃcient, enters the regressions negatively and is statistically
signiﬁcant: a one standard deviation increase in the GINI is associated with
2.53% (4.43%) reduction in the collection eﬃciency of VAT revenue as a
percentage of GDP (of consumption).
Concluding remarks
The evidence presented in this paper is consistent with the structural,
political economy approach to taxation. While our paper does not
negate the possibility of eﬃciency gains associated with greater reliance on
a VAT, it points out that these gains are not automatic, and may depend
on structural factors. We close the paper with a discussion of limitations
and future research. Our analysis focused on the de-facto eﬃciency of
VAT. A limitation of this concept is that it is aﬀected by both tax evasion,
and statutory exemptions from VAT (like allowing for lower tax rates on
some categories). The absence of detailed information prevents us at this
stage from a more detailed decomposition of the de-facto collection
eﬃciency between tax evasion and statutory exemptions. Similarly, we
assumed limited time variation in the standard VAT in each country.
Better data should allow us to improve the precision of the empirical
part. Despite these data limitations, our empirical investigation supports
the prediction of a political economy, public ﬁnance approach to taxation.
This approach may be useful in addressing the design and use of
other taxes, including income, sales and trade taxes. Identifying the trade-
oﬀs between a VAT and other taxes remains a topic worthy of future
research.
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Notes
1. The greater de-facto ﬁnancial integration may be either the outcome of policy
choice (de-jure ﬁnancial integration), or a by product of greater trade openness,
forcing greater de-facto ﬁnancial openness (see Prasad et al. 2003; Aizenman
2004; Aizenman and Noy 2005). See Gordon and Li (2005) and Jinjarak (2005)
for tax collection challenges facing developing countries.
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2. See Gordon and Nielsen (1997) for an assessment of the gains associated with the
switch to the VAT.
3. See Ebrill et. al. (2001) for a detailed discussion of these two measures of VAT
collection eﬃciency. They point out that the appropriate benchmark for the
VAT should be total consumption (being the ideal VAT base, exempting
investment), and not GDP. In addition, GDP may be subject to greater
measurement error than consumption.
4. It is easy to verify that l ﬃ ðct;n  ct;aÞ=ðct;aÞ  ½ððU00ðct;aÞÞ=ðU0ðct;aÞÞ. Hence, l is
negligible when ðct;n  ct;aÞ=ðct;aÞ is small. Note that audit risk is idiosyncratic,
and may be diversiﬁed away by distributing it across agents. The risk adjustment
would be zero in the presence of such insurance. Our analysis can be extended to the
case where the risk adjustment factor is positive, without aﬀecting the main results.
5. As in Cuikerman et al. (1992), since the tax capacity is set one period in advance,
and is reset each period, the inﬁnite horizon equilibrium is characterized by
looking one period ahead. The symmetry of the speciﬁcation implies that the
policy maker at time t is setting the tax capacity for the next period, y,
by maximizing bfUðCðyÞÞ þ ½1 pþ p 1aa XðyÞg  y. The term bfUðCðyÞÞþ½1 pþ p 1aa XðyÞg, is the discounted expected utility of the policy maker next
period, recognizing that the equilibrium private consumption does not depend
on the identity of the regime, and that the policy maker is reappointed (losing
power) with probability 1 7 p (p), enjoying utility from ﬁscal consumption of
X(y)ð1aa XðyÞÞ, respectively. The second term,7y, is the present resource cost of
the ﬁscal investment in future tax capacity, reducing the present ﬁscal
consumption enjoyed by the decision maker.
6. France was the ﬁrst to implement a VAT, in 1948. Cape Verde recently
implemented a VAT in 2004. Due to data limitations, these two countries were
excluded from the sample.
7. See Fisman and Wei (2004) for empirical evidence on the enforcement problem
dealing with tax evasion and imports.
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Data appendix
Abbreviations and acronyms
The sample comprises 44 countries over the period 1970–99. There are 454
observations. The list of countries and number of years observed are given in
Table 1. Because we only have access to the latest cross-country information on
statutory VAT rates, the panel estimation is forced to use VAT rates as of 2003. In
practice, the VAT rates do not change frequently over time.
Statutory VAT rates: Cross-country standard rates as of 2003.
Source: PWC Corporate Taxes, worldwide summaries 2003–2004
Year VAT introduced
Source: International Tax Dialogue (2005)
VAT revenue, Total tax revenue
Source: World Tax Database from the Oﬃce of Tax Policy Research, University of
Michigan. http://www.bus.umich.edu/OTPR
VAT C-eﬃciency ratio: VAT revenue to consumption divided by the 2003 standard
VAT rate; percent.
VAT eﬃciency ratio: VAT revenue to GDP divided by the 2003 standard VAT rate;
percent.
GDP Gross Domestic Product
POLITY POLITY IV Project
PWC PricewaterhouseCoopers
PWT Penn World Table 6.1
VAT Value Added Tax
WDI World Development Indicators
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Real GDP per capita: A chain GDP; US$1000.
Source: PWT; http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
Trade Openness: Exports plus imports divided by GDP; percent.
Source: PWT; http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
Agriculture share of GDP: value added (percent of GDP). Agriculture corresponds to
ISIC divisions 1–5 and includes forestry, hunting, and ﬁshing, as well as cultivation
of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net output of a sector after
adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without
making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation
of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International
Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (ISIC) revision 3.
Source: WDI (from World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National
Accounts data ﬁles); http://www.worldbank.org/data/onlinedatabases/online
databases.html
Urbanization of population: Urban population (percent of total). Urban population is
the share of the total population living in areas deﬁned as urban in each country.
Source: WDI (from United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects).
Durability of Political Regime: The number of years since the most recent regime
change (deﬁned by a three-point change in the POLITY score over a period of three
years or less) or the end of a transition period deﬁned by the lack of stable political
institutions (denoted by a standardized authority score). The ﬁrst year during which
a new (post-change) polity is established is coded as the baseline ‘year zero’
(value ¼ 0) and each subsequent year adds one to the value of the variable
consecutively until a new regime change or transition period occurs. Values are
entered for all years beginning with the ﬁrst regime change since 1800 or the date of
independence if that event occurred after 1800.
Source: POLITY; http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/
Regulation of Political Participation: Participation is regulated to the extent that there
are binding rules on when, whether, and how political preferences are expressed.
One-party states and Western democracies both regulate participation but they do so
in diﬀerent ways, the former by channeling participation through a single party
structure, with sharp limits on diversity of opinion; the latter by allowing relatively
stable and enduring groups to compete non-violently for political inﬂuence. The
polar opposite is unregulated participation, in which there are no enduring national
political organizations, and no eﬀective regime controls on political activity. In such
situations political competition is often characterized by recurring coercion among
shifting coalitions of partisan groups. The index ranges from 1 to 5:
1 ¼ unregulated. Political participation is revolving around personalities,
regional interests, and religious/ethnic/clan groups; but the number and
relative importance of such groups in national political life varies substantially
over time. There are no enduring national political organizations, and
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systematic regime control of political activity is limited; that is, a situation
characterized by a coincidence of a weak state and society. These conditions
are increasingly rare following decolonization and the increasing globalization
of economic exchange systems. In the contemporary context, uninstitutiona-
lized competition is most likely to occur in resource-poor countries and/or
following the collapse of central authority under a (former) repressive,
authoritarian state.
5 ¼ regulated. Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly
compete for political inﬂuence and positions with little use of coercion. No
signiﬁcant groups, issues, or types of conventional political action are regularly
excluded from the political process.
Source: POLITY; http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/
GINI index: Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or,
in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an
economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the
cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of
recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index
measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute
equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus, a Gini
index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect
inequality. World Bank staﬀ estimates are based on primary household survey data
obtained from government statistical agencies and World Bank country
departments.
Source: WDI (World Bank’s World Development Indicators).
410 J. Aizenman and Y. Jinjarak
